JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE
Institutional Ownership and Restructuring Charges Shielding
Effect on Executive Cash Compensation
Author(s): Angie Abdelzaher, Dina Abdelzaher
Citation: Angie Abdelzaher, Dina Abdelzaher, (2013) "Institutional Ownership and Restructuring Charges Shielding Effect on Executive Cash Compensation," Journal of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 13, Iss. 2, pp. 92 - 108
Article Type: Research paper
Publisher: North American Business Press
While previous literature linked certain corporate governance mechanisms to stronger CEO‘s
compensation shielding from restructuring charges, this study investigates the impact of shareholders
ownership characteristics, distinguishing between institutions ownership vs. managerial ownership. We
examined a longitudinal sample of 2,196 US restructuring firms for the period of 2001-2006. We found
institutional ownership to negatively moderate the shielding effect between restructuring charges and
CEO cash compensation after controlling for board size, dual CEO role, and firm performance.
Implications from this study highlight the key role of shareholders ownership characteristics in relation
to CEO compensation at a time when many firms are undergoing restructuring.